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Political Violence in a Borderland. 








This article investigates the history of the province of Kastoria (Western 
Macedonia) during the Italian occupation of Greece between 1941 and 
1943. Inhabited by an ethnically mixed population comprised of Greeks, 
Vlachs and Slavophones, this province became during occupation the site 
of armed clashes between Slavophone militias set up by the Italian 
occupation authorities and the left-wing resistance. Several factors leading 
to the formation of these collaborationist units are investigated with 
reference to the history of this region in the 1920ies and 1930ies and of the 
occupation years until the formation of the Slavophone militias in 1943. In 
contrast to existing scholarship, it is argued that interethnic violence was 
neither the necessary outcome of preceding ethnic cleavages, nor merely 
the result of the Italian policy of divide et impera. Rather, it derived from 
socio-economic dynamics that allowed for the reemergence of latent 
patterns of ethnic polarization. 




The town of Kastoria1 lies in Western Macedonia, on a peninsula 
jutting into Lake Orestias, sitting at an altitude of 630m on a promontory 
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encircled by mountains. The town and the surrounding region became 
part of the Ottoman Empire in 1385, remaining under the rule of the Porte 
until the Balkan Wars (1912-1913), when the Treaties of London and 
Bucharest sanctioned their incorporation into the Greek state. As was 
with most areas acquired by Greece with the Balkan Wars, Kastoria had a 
religiously mixed population comprised of Christians, Jews and Muslims 
and a strong linguistic diversity with Turkish-speakers, Greeks, Vlachs - a 
linguistic group speaking a dialect akin to Romanian - and Slavophones.2  
This article is focused on the history of this small province during the 
Axis occupation of Greece, when the Italian Royal Army promoted the 
formation of collaborationist units of Slavophones, under an umbrella 
organization called Bulgaro-Macedonian Revolutionary Committee 
(Boulgaro-Makedoniko Epanastatiko Komitato), to quell the spread of anti-
Axis resistance. Continued by the Germans after the Italian capitulation in 
September 1943, this policy unleashed political polarization along ethnic 
lines and led the left-wing EAM (National Liberation Front) and of its 
armed branch ELAS (Greek People’s Liberation Army) to establish a 
separate resistance organization of Greek Macedonians, the Slavo-
Macedonian Popular Liberation Front (SNOF), to curb Slavophones' 
support for the Axis.3  
Most historians hold that the formation of the Committee in March 
1943 was stemmed from cooperation between Italy and Bulgaria and that 
the pro-Slavophone stance of the Italian authorities was set from the very 
beginning of the occupation.4 In line with this interpretative scheme, 
                                                                                                              
1 According to the 1940 census the population of the eparchy of Kastoria was 68.237 
inhabitants, 33.206 men and 35.031 women. The population of the town itself accounted for 
10.181 inhabitants. 
2 Terminology on ethnic groups has been highly contentious in the scholarship about 
Macedonia. The most common terms used for the Slav-speakers of Macedonia are 
Slavophones, Slav Macedonians, Bulgarians. I decided the employ the term Slavophones, as 
this seems the most neutral one. With a similar motivation the same term is employed by 
Andréas Athanasiádīs, Stī skiá tou «voylgarismoý». Apotypṓseis «politikṓn kai ethnikṓn 
fronīmatōn» tōn politṓn tīs periféreias Flṓrinas katá tīn período tou Mesopolémoy (Thessaloniki: 
Epíketro, 2017). 
3 Historians have long debated about the role played by Yugoslav intervention in the 
creation of this organization, with anti-communist historians accusing the EAM of 
subalternity to Tito's plans for the annexation of Greek Macedonia. Recent historiography 
sees the formation of the SNOF rather as an attempt to integrate the Slavophone population 
into the resistance, thus curbing support for the Axis, see Giṓrgos Koymarídīs, “Snof kai 
slavomakedoniká tágmata (1943-1944): Mia proséggisī”, Archeiotáxio, 11 (2009): 55-87; Īlías 
Groýios, SNOF: Ī sygkrόtīsī kai ī drásī tou stī Dytikī ́ Makedonía, (Master Thesis, University of 
Western Macedonia, 2019). 
4 A brief review in Tásos Kōstόpoulos, "To «Axomakedonikό» Komitáto kai Ochrána (1943-
1944): mia prṓtī proséggisī", Archeiotáxio 5, (2003): 40-51. 
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much scholarship argues that the convergence between the Axis powers 
and the Slav Macedonians was a predetermined outcome, since a 
common objective of both was to "plunder loyalties"5 and thus 
denationalize Greek Macedonia. Based on yet unexplored records of the 
Italian army, this article challenges this view. In fact, initially the Italian 
authorities in Kastoria had little interest in arming any ethnic group and 
opposed any pro-Bulgaria or Macedonian movement. Far from being 
cordial, relations between Italy and Bulgaria were characterized by 
mutual mistrust and competition. Only later on, when confronted with 
the challenge posed by the resistance, did Italians employ ethnic 
minorities to regain control of the province. Contrary to accepted 
wisdom, though acting as a precipitating factor, the occupiers were not 
always the most relevant force at play. In fact, with their decisions to 
hand over arms to the Slavophones the Italian authorities rather 
sanctioned a complex social transformation process that led political 
violence to be coded in the language of ethnicity.  
To support this argument, the following essay first sketches the 
history of the region in the interwar years, when patterns of political 
behavior took form that were to resurface during the war. Hence, it 
examines the governance strategies employed by the local occupation 
authorities and the way the socio-economic crisis led to a disintegration of 
the social fabric. Finally, the last section addresses the formation of the 
collaborationist units and the role they played in the Italian 
counterinsurgency. 
The Slavophones of Kastoria in the Interwar Years 
Insurgencies and inter-ethnic conflicts had a long history in the 
whole of Macedonia, gaining momentum at the turn of the century and 
markedly between 1903 and 1908, when the region became the site of 
inter-ethnic strife between pro-Bulgarian and pro-Greek paramilitary 
formations, the so called "Macedonian Struggle" (Makedonikós Agṓnas). 
Kastoria was an important center of pro-Greek activity with prominent 
citizens becoming legendary "Macedonian fighters" (makedonomáchoi) and, 
thus, influential political figures in local politics in the interwar years.6 
The Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization (IMRO), a political 
                                                 
5 John Koliopoulos, Plundered loyalties : Axis occupation and civil strife in Greek West Macedonia, 
1941-1949, (London: C. Hurst, 1999).  
6 Vasílīs K. Goýnarīs, “Voyleytés kai Kapetánioi: Pelateiakés schéseis stī mesopolemikī ́ 
Makedonía”, Ellīniká, 41 (1990): 313-335. One of them, Filolaos Picheon, was appointed 




movement with a Macedonian-autonomist, at times pro-Bulgarian agenda 
developed its activity during the Macedonian Struggle and kept 
operating in the ollowing decades.7 Armed conflicts, however, were not 
only driven by nationalistic agendas. In fact, economic demands played a 
key role as political affiliation was partly determined by the prospect of 
the dispossessed peasants to gain land.8 
The incorporation of Macedonia into the Greek state in 1913 and the 
post-World War I population exchanges - the voluntary one with Bulgaria 
and the compulsory one with Turkey - impacted significantly on the 
demographic outlook of the region. As a consequence of these 
developments, nearly all Muslims, representing 1/4 of the population at 
the turn of the century, left and the Slavophone community shrunk 
dramatically, being replaced by incoming refugees.9 Though relevant per 
se, these events impacted Western Macedonia less than the Central and 
Eastern part of this region, as the former area had a comparatively smaller 
amount of arable land to be used for resettlement. Furthermore, for the 
sake of maintaining good relations with neighboring Yugoslavia, the 
Greek government refrained from settling great masses of refugees in 
Western Macedonia and avoided a large emigration of Slavophones. This 
explains why in the interwar years the provinces of Kastoria and Florina 
still hosted the largest number of Slavophones in the whole of 
Macedonia.10 A statistics from the General  Administration of Macedonia 
reported the population of Kastoria in 1925 as being composed of:11 
- 17,737 Greeks (natives), a category that excluded the refugees who 
arrived from Asia Minor after the population exchange with Turkey: 
- 2,195 pro-Greek Vlach-speakers 
- 213 Muslim-Albanians, exempted from the population exchange 
                                                 
7 IMRO lost the support of the Bulgarian authorities in 1934, after the creation of the Zveno-
dictatorial regime that promoted good relations with Yugoslavia, becoming a rather 
marginal phenomenon Stefan Troebst, Mussolini, Makedonien und die Mächte, 1922-1930: die 
"Innere Makedonische Revolutionäre Organisation" in der Südosteuropapolitik des faschistischen 
Italien, (Köln: Böhlau, 1987).. 
8 Raymondos Alvanos, (2019) "Parliamentary politics as an integration mechanism: The 
Slavic-speaking inhabitants of interwar (1922–1940) Western Greek Macedonia", History and 
Anthropology 30, No. 5 (2009): 622. 
9 Raÿmóndos Alvanόs, Koinōnikés Sygkroýseis kai politikés sumperiforés stīn periochī ́ tīs Katoriás 
(PhD diss., Aristotle University Thessaloniki, 2005), 37. 17,894 Muslim and Slavophone 
inhabitants left, while 8,370 refugees were settled in the region. 
10 Vasílīs K. Goýnarīs, “Oi slavόfōnoi tīs Μακεδονíας. Ī poreía tīs ensōmátōsīs sto ellīnikό 
ethnikό krátos, 1870-1940”, Makedoniká, 29 (1993-1994): 209-237, here 229. 
11 Elisabeth Kontogiorgi. Population Exchange in Greek Macedonia: The Rural Settlement of 
Refugees 1922–1930 (New York: Oxford University Press. 2006), 250. 
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- 7,339 Slav-speakers, former Patriarchists 
- 14,807 Slavs-speakers former Exarchists 
- 135 Vlach-speakers pro-Romanian, namely the Vlachs that openly 
expressed their support of a separate Vlach identity. 
- 525 Jews 
- 5,962 Greek refugees.12 
With a pattern common to most of the Balkans and Eastern Europe, 
ethnic and religious cleavages in Kastoria intersected with social 
stratification. From the 16th century onwards, Kastoria developed a 
burgeoning fur production and trading activities that made the town the 
knot of a large commercial network spanning throughout Europe. While 
Jews were particularly active in fur trade, craftsmanship was mostly 
performed by Greeks working in close collaboration with Jewish 
merchants. Cooperation between the two groups was smooth and made 
the economy of the town flourish, especially in the 19th century. Most 
Slavophones, instead, were peasants inhabiting the surrounding area of 
Kastoria who used to come to town mostly on market days.13 Not unlike 
the town itself, the countryside was ethnically inhomogeneous, with the 
Northern part of the province being predominantly, but not exclusively, 
inhabited by Slavophones and the South mostly by Greek speakers.14  
All over Greece the refugees' settlement was marred by conflicts over 
the distribution of the land. Former Muslim property was to be used to 
                                                 
12 Kontogiorgi, Population Exchange, 250. The difference between the number of refugees 
reported in this survey and the overall figure of 8,370 is due to the fact that the settlement 
process took several years to be completed. This survey is has to be taken with a grain of 
salt, as taxonomies used to categorize the population were largely the product of 
nationalistic biases. Greek authorities usually saw ethnic groups through the lens of political 
categories, distinguishing e. g. between pro-Greek and pro-Romanian Vlachs. The same 
applies to the Slavophones (also called voylgarizontes) that were split into former 
Patriarchists and Exarchists, the latter term meaning those who had joined the Bulgarian de-
facto autocephalous Orthodox Church founded in 1870 and were considered of "Bulgarian 
consciousness". See Iakovos  D.  Michailidis,  “The  statistical  battle  for  the  population  of  
Greek  Macedonia,”  in  The   history   of   Macedonia,   ed. Ioannis   Koliopoulos (Thessaloniki:   
Museum   of   the   Macedonian Struggle Foundation, 2007), 269-283; on the systematic 
underestimation of non-Greek ethnic groups in the Greek population censuses from the 
foundation of the state see  Tasos Kostopoulos, “Counting the 'Other': Official Census and 
Classified Statistics in Greece (1830-2001)”, Jahrbücher für Geschichte und Kultur Südosteuropas, 
5 (2003): 55-78. 
13 Raÿmóndos Alvanós, “Koinōnikés kai politikés ópseis tīs synýparxīs Christianōn kai 
Evraiōn stīn pólī tīs Kastoriás,” in To olokaýtōma tōn ebraiōn tīs Elládas, ed. Giṓrgos Antōnou, 
Strátos Dordanás, Níkos Záikos, Níkos Marantzídīs (Thessaloniki: Epíkentro, 2011), 353-378. 
14 Vasílīs K. Goýnarīs, “Oi slavόfōnoi tīs Μακεδονíας. Ī poreía tīs ensōmátōsīs sto ellīnikό 




resettle the refugees but it proved insufficient as those who left were 
significantly less numerous than those who arrived. In addition, the land 
to be distributed had been tilled for years by local sharecroppers who 
now claimed their right to own it. Moreover, after 1912, when the first 
Muslims had started leaving the regions of Northern Greece, many of 
them had sold their land to locals or these had just taken possession of it. 
These acts were not recognized by the Greek state thus becoming a source 
of bitter quarrels over the following decade, as land distribution was a 
long process that lasted until the mid-30s.15 Finally, the resettlement 
process was plagued by administrative inefficiency creating fertile 
ground for grievances.16 As a consequence of all this, land issues sparked 
conflicts between natives (dópioi) and refugees, with the former regarding 
the new inhabitants' claim to land ownership as illegitimate. 
Faced with such transformations, Slavophones in Kastoria adopted 
different and contradicting strategies. One was to join the local Greek 
element in its attempt to oppose the settlement of refugees.17 To support 
their claim to land, refugees represented themselves as more "Greek" than 
their local co-nationals spurring other groups to compete in the same 
arena. Material conflicts, thus, came be articulated in the language of 
ethnic belonging, largely as a negotiation over the meaning of Greekness, 
a symbolic capital that promised access to a larger share of resources. 
"The local leadership of the Slav speaking villagers", has written R. 
Alvanos, "knew very well the role that the refugees had come to play in 
the region, i. e. that of Hellenization. As far as this role threatened the 
interests of the native villagers these perceived that they should play this 
game by the same rules: by exposing their own "local" Greekness."18 Thus, 
the Slavophones showed a strong tendency to assimilate with the Greek 
culture, which among other things is witnessed by their increased 
propensity to join agricultural cooperatives.19 In addition to these factors 
came the agrarian reform of the early 20s - whereby former Ottoman 
tchifliks were distributed to peasants creating a large class of smallholders. 
As land issues were managed mostly by local politicians who acted as 
intermediaries with the political center, land distribution integrated the 
Slavophones into the patronage system.20 Polarization between 
Slavophones and refugees was thus mirrored in national politics with the 
                                                 
15 Kontogiorgi, Population Exchange, 165-185. 
16 Goýnarīs, “Oi slavófonoi tīs Makedonías,” 225-226. 
17 Alvanós, Koinōnikés sygkroýseis, 50. 
18 Alvanós, Koinōnikés sygkroýseis, 59. 
19 Alvanós, Koinōnikés sygkroýseis, 40. 
20 Alvanos, “Parliamentary politics”. 
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latter largely supporting Venizelism and the Liberal Party and, largely as 
a consequence of this, the former siding massively with the opposite bloc, 
the Popular Party.21 Despite the fact that the Communist party of Greece 
in 1924 officially adopted the Comintern guidelines supporting 
Macedonian independentism, communism never really challenged the 
Popular Party's hegemony among the Slavophones.22  
In some instances Slavophones adopted a different strategy to claim 
a larger share of material resources, namely that of appealing to external 
powers (Yugoslavia and Bulgaria). Motivated by territorial revisionism, 
these countries sought to exploit the land issue as a means to acquire 
political foothold in the region. Victimized Slav speaking peasants, thus, 
saw a professed belonging to a foreign nation state as a way to claim 
international protection by the League of Nations.23  
The attitude of the Greek authorities towards what they considered 
as “ethnic aliens” was rather ambiguous. While embracing the idea that 
increasing the "density" of Greek settlements in a border region such as 
Western Macedonia was desirable, most Greek officials also understood 
that favoring too much the refugees could stimulate the Slavophones to 
claim with more force their "otherness". All in all, however, efforts of the 
public authorities to Hellenize the Slavophone population intensified in 
the interwar period, especially as local officials were particularly zealous 
in pursuing this policy.24  
The outcome of these conflicting trends was not straightforward. 
Historian R. Alvanos holds that the forces pushing towards assimilation 
prevailed over those fostering deepening ethnic cleavages. As a result, in 
the interwar years and up to 1936 ethnic identifications in Kastoria lost 
political momentum.25 The advent of Metaxas' authoritarian regime in 
1936, though, inverted this trend. The 4th August regime's attitude 
towards non-Greek groups was one of deep mistrust and resulted in 
increased repression, with the Slavophones being prohibited to speak 
their language in public.26 Assimilationist policies that in the interwar 
                                                 
21 Goýnarīs, “Oi slavófonoi tīs Makedonías,” p. 233. 
22 Giorgios T. Mavrogordatos, Stillborn Republic: Social Coalitions and Party Strategies in Greece, 
1922-1936, (Berkeley/Los Angeles: University of California Press 1983), 249-252. 
23 Kontogiorgi, Population Exchange, 200-230. 
24 Philipp Carabott, "The Greek State and its Slav-Speaking Minority," Jahrbücher für 
Geschichte und Kultur Südosteuropas 5, (2003): 141-159. 
25 Alvanos, Parliamentary politics. 
26 Tásos Kōstόpoulos, Ī apagoreyménī glṓssa. Kratikī́ katastolī́ tōn slavikṓn dialéktōn stīn ellīnikī ́ 




years had been advocated and carried out only by a fraction of state 
officials - the most nationalist faction – now became state ideology. 
Moreover, as a consequence of the Emergency Law 376/1936, the regions 
inhabited by Slavophones were declared "surveillance areas" where 
special prohibitions limiting the citizens' liberties could be issued. Many 
of them were put to confinement as communist or individuals accused of 
anti-national behavior.27 The suspension of parliamentary politics added 
to this, bringing to an end the patronage system, a powerful mechanism 
of integration of the Slavophones. Furthermore, the economic policy of 
the Metaxas regime that intensified tobacco production sharpened 
economic inequalities between refugees and natives. The former 
benefitted from state control over production as, being considered more 
reliable than the Slavophones, they were granted more easily permits to 
cultivate tobacco. Efforts of the regime to undermine stockbreeding was a 
further source of hardship to the Slavophones.28 Finally, the 1940-41 war 
between Fascist Italy and Greece further escalated ethnic polarization. 
Slavophones, already perceived during the interwar period as enemy 
agents, were now strongly suspected of supporting the invader. Thus, 
along with Chams and Vlachs, a number of members of this minority 
were also interned as they were perceived as a potential threat. 
Italian Plans for Macedonia 
As a consequence of the invasion of Greece by the Axis powers, in 
April 1941 Macedonia was split into three occupation areas: Eastern 
Macedonia went to Bulgaria becoming part of the new Bulgarian province 
of Belomorje; most of Central and parts of Western Macedonia were 
occupied by German troops; Italy was allotted the smallest share of the 
region, with only two towns, Grevena and Kastoria. Italian authorities 
had no definite political plans for Greece before the attack of October 1940 
and even after the invasion their war aims remained rather generic. In 
preparation for the Italo-German conversations held at Vienna in April 
1941 and in the following months, a number of memoranda were drafted 
by Italian state agencies regarding the postwar settlement in the 
Balkans.29 Most of these plans converged on the idea that a large portion 
                                                 
27 Surveillance or controlled areas (epitiroýmenes zṓnes) created a sort of internal frontier 
within the Greek territory. They continued to exist after the war and well into the 1990s, see 
Lois Labrianidis, "Internal Frontiers as a Hindrance to Development”,  European Planning 
Studies, 9, No. 1, (2001): 85-103. 
28 Alvanós, Koinōnikés sygkroýseis, 188-193. 
29 See e. g. “Promemoria relativo al nuovo confine tra l'Albania e la Grecia”, 1 June 1941, 
Politisches Archiv Auswäriges Amt (hereafter PA AA) 105125; Comando Supremo a 
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of North-Western Greece, a region lying to the West of the Pindus Chain 
and of a line running up to the Arta Gulf, should be carved out and 
attached to Albania. Along with the annexation of Kosovo and parts of 
Montenegro, this would fulfill the aspirations of the Albanians to 
incorporate their ethnic kin living within foreign states. On the contrary, 
Macedonia was to remain part of Greece, in fulfillment of one of the basic 
tenets of Fascist empire building i.e., as Mussolini said in a much-quoted 
speech, that Italy's New Order should make "the ethnic element" 
correspond with the "political and geographic".30 In line with this 
principle, Italy strove to create political bodies with homogeneous ethnic 
character, avoiding the creation of large ethnic minorities. Since the 
Italian authorities considered Macedonia as thoroughly "Hellenized" by 
Athens in the interwar years and, therefore, an inseparable part of the 
country, they deemed it unadvisable to attach it to Albania. The 
possibility of creating an independent Macedonian state was considered 
but rejected for fear that this new creature would became a proxy of 
Bulgaria or Germany.31 All this, though, did not apply to Kastoria that 
was considered separately from the rest of the region. Most Italians 
authorities shared the view that the Slav-speaking population of this 
province, which they estimated around 1/3 of the total, were incapable of 
developing a real national identity as they were mostly peasants without 
political consciousness. Pro-Bulgarian attitudes among the Slavophones 
of Kastoria were seen as the product of Bulgarian propaganda among 
illiterate peasants rather than a spontaneous national movement. Given 
the composite nature of the population and the strategic position of this 
province, therefore, most internal documents suggested attaching it to 
Albania.32 
Such plans did not come to fruition. Being defeated by the Greeks on 
the battlefield and forced to seek for German military support to invade 
the country, the authorities of Rome had to abide by the German wish to 
establish a regime of classic military occupation, with a Greek 
government and institutions in charge of running the administration of 
                                                                                                              
Ministero degli Affari Esteri, "Nuovo Confine tra Albania e Grecia, 17 luglio 1941, PA AA 
105125 
30 Corriere della Sera, 11.6.1941. 
31 Paolo Fonzi, Fame di guerra. L'occupazione italiana della Grecia (1941-43) (Roma: Carocci, 
2019), 36. 
32 A typical example of this attitude is in the memorandum Ufficio del Generale Delegato del 
Comando Supremo presso la Commissione Centrale Delimitazione Confini del Comando 
Supremo presso la Commissione sulla confinazione nella Macedonia occidentale, "Studio 
sulla confinazione nella Macedonia occidentale" August 1942, Archivio dell’Ufficio Storico 




the country. Moreover, since the Greeks did not consider itself as a 
defeated country, Prime Minister Georgios Tsolakoglou, head of the 
collaborationist government, set as a precondition to his appointment that 
Italians territorial claims be silenced, as fulfilling them would have 
undermined its legitimacy towards the Greek population. This attitude 
compelled Germany to impose the postponement of these claimes to the 
territorial settlement to be negotiated after the end of the war. As a result, 
besides a number of regions where the Italians appointed civilians 
governors, over the two following years they governed the country 
through a sort of indirect rule, largely relying on the collaboration of local 
elites.33 
Italian Governance in Kastoria 
In observance of the armistice, the areas of Greece assigned to Italy 
were initially garrisoned by the Wehrmacht, which handed them over to 
the Italian army after a few weeks. As in much of Northern Greece, in 
Kastoria this initial phase was characterized by an institutional void, with 
key state institutions such as the gendarmerie and the tribunals not 
performing their duties and the administration being solely entrusted to 
village councils and mayors. This state of exception ended upon arrival of 
the 13th Rgt. of the Pinerolo Division, on 27 June 1941, when the local 
Metropolite Nikiforos went to Athens to ask the government for the 
appointment of civilian authorities. Gerasimos Voulieris, who was to run 
the administration of the district until April 1942, was thus designated 
sub-prefect (éparchos).34  
Despite its brevity, the interlude of self-government gave the 
Slavophone villages a sense of independence from the central Greek 
authorities, with "civil guards" (politofylakī́) taking over policing duties.35 
In the uncertainty following the collapse of the Greek army, some 
communities asked to be attached to Bulgaria or ruled by Bulgarian 
personnel. It goes without saying that this also increased the mistrust of 
the Greek authorities towards the Slav-speaking population. In the eyes 
of the Greek officials appointed in May-June 1941, their major task was to 
save the region from slipping into anarchy and from the spread of foreign 
propaganda. In part, as already mentioned, this attitude had informed the 
                                                 
33 Fonzi, Fame di guerra, 86-112. 
34 When in July 1941 the province of Kastoria was made independent from the prefecture of 
Kozani, he became its prefect (nómarchos), Decree 325/1941, ΦΕΚ 257/Α΄/31.07.1941. 
35 Sofía Īliádou-Táchou, Ta chrṓmata tīs vías stī Dytikī ́Makedonía 1941-1944. Katochī ́- Antístasī - 
Ethnotikés kai Emfýlies Sygkroýseis (Thessaloniki: Epíkentro, 2017), 100. 
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behavior of the Greek authorities already in the interwar years. As these 
areas had bordered states that tried to exploit the national issue to expand 
southwards, such as Yugoslavia and Bulgaria, state officials appointed 
there had a sort of "trench mentality", considering themselves as outposts 
of Hellenic civilization in foreign territory.36 
Cooperation between the Italians and the Greek local authorities ran 
smoothly in the first months. As the Italian authorities’ primary concern 
was to reestablish the rule of law, they regarded the attempts of the Slav 
population to oppose law enforcement as an undesired source of chaos. 
Also, they were apprehensive about the activity of the Bulgarian 
representatives who toured the region distributing foodstuffs to 
Slavophone villagers and conducting pro-Bulgarian propaganda.37  To 
strengthen their appeal to the population the Bulgarian envoys promised 
that, with the annexation of the region to Bulgaria, local peasants would 
be returned all that had been seized them by the refugees.38 Worried by 
the prospect of losing control of Macedonia, the local Italian authorities 
expelled repeatedly Bulgarian envoys and wanted food distribution to be 
entrusted solely to the Greek authorities.39 
To be sure, the initial synergy between the Italians and the Greek 
authorities was a mere marriage of convenience. In fact, Italians were 
suspicious also towards Greek officials, as they saw that their conduct 
was guided by anti-Slavic sentiments. They understood, for example, that 
the gendarmerie displayed far greater harshness in punishing crimes 
committed by Slavophones than by Greeks. Furthermore, in order to 
persecute suspected communists they could not but rely on the 
                                                 
36 A similar attitude shaped the mentality of the Italian officials posted by Rome in the 
Italian borderlands with Yugoslavia, where a peculiar "frontier Fascism", imbued with 
violent anti-Slavic stereotypes, developed. See  Annamaria Vinci, Sentinelle della patria. Il 
fascismo al confine orientale 1918-1941 (Roma-Bari: Laterza, 2011). 
37 On the tense relations between Bulgaria and Italy between 1941 and 1943 due to the 
conflicting territorial claims of both sides in Vardar Macedonia see Alberto Basciani, “Alleati 
per caso. Italia e Bulgaria durante la Seconda guerra mondiale”, in 40 anni di relazioni fra 
Italia e Bulgaria. Diplomazia, Economia, Cultura - 140 ГОДИНИ ОТНОШЕНИЯ МЕЖДУ 
ИТАЛИЯ И БЪЛГАРИЯ ДИПЛОМАЦИЯ, ИКОНОМИКА, КУЛТУРА (1879–2019), ed. 
Stefano Baldi - Alexander Kostov (Sofia: Tendril Publishing House, 2020,) 155-186. 
38 This information about Bulgarian propaganda was given by a local informant Galáteia 
Christodýloy, “Schéseis synergasías kai sýgkroysīs tōn chōriṓn toy Dīmoy Makedonṓn 
Kastoriás katá ton eikostό aiṓna.” (BSc thesis, ΤΕΙ Western Macedonia, 2004), 22. This paper 
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39 In September 1941 Ivan Dujčev, Professor of  Bulgarian History at Sofia University, who 
worked as an interpreter for the Italian authorities was removed and expelled, Comando 
divisione Pinerolo, “Organizzazione comunista macedone (Comunistì Orgànosis 




information provided by the Greek authorities40 and on lists compiled 
during the Metaxas years.41 All this was a source of great concern to them 
as they clearly saw that this information was biased against the 
Slavophones. It was, however, impossible for the Italian authorities to 
take over the administration of the region or to replace the Greek 
personnel as they lacked sufficient knowledge of the environment and 
had to rely initially on the local Greek administration to sort out 
opponents. Only in November 1941, in the context of a general reform of 
the gendarmerie, the Italian authorities managed to have some of 
members of the local gendarmerie, whom they designed as 
"ultranationalist", removed.42  
It is interesting to note that the Italians’ attitude was, and remained 
until the very end of their occupation in September 1943, one of extreme 
mistrust towards the multi-ethnic environment they were in. 
Significantly, Gen. Cesare Benelli, Commander of the Pinerolo Division, 
in a report from January 194243 distinguished the population of Western 
Macedonia and Thessaly into five groups: Slavs, Aromanians, Jews, Greek 
elites and Greek peasants. In the General’s opinion all of these groups 
were unreliable as collaborators, except for the Greek peasants who, he 
believed, admired Fascist Italy sincerely as a country with real social 
justice. Particularly worrying for the General was the presence of a Jewish 
community, as witnessed by numerous anti-Semitic passages in his 
reports.44 Although Jews were never interned and survived safely the 
Italian occupation, being deported by the Germans in 1944, the Italian 
intelligence service kept them under strict control and imposed 
restrictions on their freedom to communicate through telephone.45 Jews 
who escaped to Kastoria when the first wave of persecutions by the 
                                                 
40 Comando Divisione Pinerolo, “Relazione sulla situazione politico-amministrativa”, 3 
settembre 1941, AUSSME N1-11-462. 
41 Such stereotypes were common in Italy, especially in the army. However,  Italians did not 
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communist stereotype rather to the Bulgarian officers in the region and to Bulgaria in 
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42 Fonzi, Fame di guerra, 128-129. 
43 Comando Divisione Pinerolo, (Nucleo P), “Relazione mensile”, 20 January 1942, AUSSME 
N1-11-542. 
44 See e. g.,  Comando Divisione Pinerolo (Ufficio Affari Civili), “Relazione quindicinale sulla 
situazione politico-amministrativa”, 20 January 1942, AUSSME N1-11-542. 
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Germans took place in Salonika were arrested by the Italians.46 All in all, 
it can be concluded that ethnic cleavages were not seen by the Italians as 
an opportunity to establish collaboration but rather as a mere threat to 
public order and the enforcement of state law. 
Smuggle and Food Crisis 
As wartime Greece was hit by a severe food crisis immediately after 
the inception of occupation, black marketeering became a common social 
praxis. The collapse of the internal transport system and the parallel 
decrease in food availability was conducive to the development of a large 
para-state.47 Border regions such as Kastoria were particularly well suited 
for smuggling. The abrupt end of the war meant that the Greek army was 
not demobilized in an orderly manner but dispersed rather chaotically, 
with many soldiers returning home by their own means. Although they 
soon gathered in the major ports in search of a possibility to embark on 
ships, a large amount remained for some time in the northern areas. Here 
they sold large amounts of army stock, such as pack animals and 
weapons, to the population, which resulted in the inhabitants largely 
engaging in smuggle over the next years and in a strong concentration of 
weapons. 
As soon as the war ended in April 1941, a large stream of commerce 
set on between Albania and Kastoria. Greek authorities complained that 
Albanian merchants would come to Kastoria and buy any sort of items as 
prices in the region were initially particularly low in comparison to those 
in Albania, where, as an effect of war and of the Italian large investments, 
inflation was already on the rise.48 The proximity of different boundaries 
in a small area hindered law enforcement, as outlaws could easily seek 
refuge over the border. Tightening the borders around the plateau of 
Kastoria became, thus, one of the foremost targets of the Italian 
authorities, though to little avail. As an effect of the partition of the region 
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into different occupation areas, people from Kastoria exploited 
differences in economic conditions between the German area (the 
demarcation line run a few km north-east of the town), Bulgaria occupied 
Bitola (80km from Kastoria) and Albania. Familiarity with the culture and 
the language of Macedonia increased the Slavophones’ disposition to 
exploit connections with neighboring Bitola. These movements were 
mostly of non-political nature, namely motivated by the will to escape 
social conditions prevailing in the district, when food scarcity made itself 
felt. Later on, when Italian authorities started to persecute political 
opponents, passing the border became an easy way to escape prosecution 
and many Slavophones found refuge in the Bulgarian part of Macedonia. 
Although the small town of Kastoria never experienced the same 
dramatic rise in starvation deaths as Athens or Salonika, it did suffer hard 
economic setback.49 First, manufacture that constituted a main source of 
income for the town underwent a general crisis. Collapse of trade 
networks and shortages of raw materials struck a hard blow to the once 
flourishing local economy. The multiplication of borders aggravated the 
economic crisis. The Kastoria plateau was detached from most of its 
surrounding areas, in particular from Florina, which was put under 
German rule. Adding to the collapse of transport caused by the dearth of 
vehicles and fuel, this led to increased isolation. For vital items such as 
fuel, for example, Kastoria had to be supplied from Florina and Salonika, 
which implied lengthy negotiations and often run against the lack of 
cooperation with the German authorities.50 Finally, just as the rest of 
Macedonia, Kastoria saw an influx of refugees from Eastern Macedonia 
and Thrace, under Bulgarian occupation, who escaped persecution. Until 
the Greek government introduced a redistribution scheme of the refugees 
in all regions of Greece, most of them concentrated in the immediate 
adjoining areas, namely German and Italian occupied Macedonia.51 
While in terms of foodstuffs the town was never completely self-
sufficient, its agricultural surroundings may have assured a certain 
degree of food security. Initially, local Italian authorities planned to feed 
the town off its hinterland. Greek state authorities imposed mandatory 
                                                 
49 Tzavára, Koinōnikī́ geōgrafía tīs peínas, v.1: 265-295, v. 2: 126-168. 
50 Comando Divisione Pinerolo, “ Relazione sulla situazione politico-amministrativa del 
territorio occupato”, 27 August 1941, AUSSME N1-11-462; 4464, Befehlshaber 
Saloniki/Ägäis, “Montalicher Verwaltungsbericht September-Oktober 1942”, Bundesarchiv 
Militärarchiv Freiburg RW 40-161. 
51 The exchange of messages between the Greek Government and the German authorities on 
redistribution is in Archeío Ypourgeío Exoterikṓn, Athens KY 1941.3.3 
POLITICAL VIOLENCE IN A BORDERLAND 
87 
 
crops collection on the peasants but, as Italian reports signaled as early as 
August 1941, collected quotas were only a tiny fraction of estimated 
production. Much of the local crops found their way into the black market 
and to other regions where demand and prices were considerably higher. 
In the whole of Greece, the food crisis undermined the legitimacy of 
the state. As state intervention in the economy had increased in the 
interwar years, particularly in the field of food production and 
distribution, the failure to meet the demands of the population was 
particularly harmful to the legitimacy of the public authorities.52 
Furthermore, hyperinflation and food crisis undermined state 
governance, as public officials' pay did not keep pace with price increases. 
This resulted in widespread corruption and delegitimization in the eyes 
of most citizens. In the first year of occupation, riots against local Greek 
officials broke out all over the country. In some cases, they even led the 
population to ask for the Italians to take over the administration.53 
Conflicts between the state and the peasants over the control of food 
resources reached their peak in the summer of 1942. To prevent the 
peasants from selling agricultural produce on the black market, the 
occupation authorities and the Greek gendarmerie went great lengths in 
trying to enforce mandatory crops collection by the use of violence. In 
regions with multi-ethnic population these conflicts intersected with 
ethnic cleavages. In Kastoria, for example, conflicts over crops were coded 
in "ethnic terms" following a pattern that, as already seen, had established 
itself in the region in the interwar years. Thus, in Slavophone villages 
opposition to public crops collection was conceived of as a form of 
resistance to the Greek state. Interestingly, the same occurred in 
Thesprotia (Chameria), a Greek region at the border with Albania, where 
the Muslim-Albanian population put up particularly strong resistance to 
public crops collection.  
Applying a simplified template, much of the scholarship explains the 
collapse of state institutions with the intentional activity of the 
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Slavophone minority that, influenced by the Bulgarian propaganda, 
refused to obey the Greek authorities. Recent studies tend to explain the 
increase in ethnic attrition with the interwar repressive policies that 
reached their peak during the Metaxas regime.54 In my opinion, both 
explanations are only partially correct and need to be combined to fully 
grasp the dynamics at play. While the history of the interwar years set the 
templates in which local conflicts were articulated, these were not their 
only possible manifestation. The process through which local conflicts 
over material and symbolic resources became increasingly ethnicized 
occurred as a consequence of several factors. As the economic crisis 
deepened the split between the town and the surrounding countryside, 
this cleavage came to be seen increasingly as an opposition between 
"state" and "Slavophone countryside". It should be regarded, therefore, as 
a crisis of hegemony that induced those groups that perceived themselves 
as "subaltern" to resort to one of the social codes through which 
opposition had been articulated in the interwar years. 
 
Towards Armed Collaboration 
It was not long before cooperation between Greek authorities and 
Italian occupation forces began to fall apart. Italians were in principal 
adverse to favoring the pro-Bulgarian movement and saw their main goal 
being that of disarming the population and recognizing the state 
representative and the occupiers as the only legitimate bearer of arms. 
With the passing of time, though, they became increasingly aware that 
Greek authorities pursued their own ethnic and political agendas and 
were therefore dysfunctional to their governance. In addition, Italians 
encountered strong difficulties in disarming the population and became 
extremely concerned about their lack of control of territory. As an effect 
from all this, in a matter of months relations with the prefect began to 
sour. Though initially content with their behavior towards the Slav 
population, in October 1941, Prefect Voulieris complained that the Italians 
favored explicitly the Slavs and repressed with particular harshness the 
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refugees.55 Not surprisingly, in April 1942, he was interned by the Italians 
and substituted with a new prefect.56 
What is more, the province displayed increasing instability. This is 
testified by the fact that Italian reprisals against civilians occurred much 
earlier in this province than in the rest of Greece. As early as December 
1941, Italians conducted in Kastoria mopping up operations with a large 
use of torture and beatings. Also, in July 1942, in response to the killing of 
two Italian soldiers, two suspects were killed without trial and their 
village was set on fire, a practice that at that time was extremely rare in 
the Italian occupation area.57 Evidence shows that in those months the 
Italian authorities of Kastoria started relying increasingly on the Slav-
speaking population. Though still refusing any commitment to a pro-
Macedonia policy, the Italian army used them increasingly, along with 
the Vlachs, as guides and informants in mopping up operations outside 
the region. 
Despite this early escalation of violence, armed resistance in the 
Kastoria district developed only at a relatively late stage. While a first 
network of EAM-activists was formed early on by a group of communists 
liberated at the request of the Bulgarian government from the internment 
camp of Akronauplia, guerrilla activity followed only with a certain 
delay. The first armed band started operating in the mountains in April 
1942, but it dispersed after two months owing to Italian repression, lack of 
supply and the hostility of the Slavophone population.58 A former 
resistance member explained this delay with the entrenched anti-
Communist feelings of the urban bourgeoisie and the ethnic conflicts 
between Greeks and Slavophones.59 A more active resistance began only 
in the first months of 1943 and increasingly in March, with the formation 
of local ELAS-units and the arrival of bands from South-West Macedonia. 
By that time large parts of Macedonia south of Kastoria and Thessaly 
were already under partisan control. In February, the Italians had started 
giving up isolated posts scattered in the countryside and had ordered the 
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disarmament of Greek gendarmerie to prevent them from being captured 
or make common cause with the partisans. In the battle of Fardykampos 
(near Siatista), on 5-6 March 1943, an entire Italian battalion was taken 
prisoner by the partisans and two weeks later, the town of Grevena was 
abandoned by Italian forces. As a consequence, the Italian garrison of 
Kastoria and the few military posts in the region became a sort of enclave 
encircled by the enemy. Normal supply lines were interrupted since 
Kastoria and Grevena could only be reached from Korça (Albania) 
through Amynteion, situated in the German occupied area. 
Facing complete isolation, in March 1943 the Italians had to 
overcome their reluctance to distribute weapon to minorities and decided 
the formation of armed units of Slavophones. There are no reliable figures 
on the number of armed men, as Italian records are extremely spare in 
this period, but Bulgarian sources provide a number of 1,600. While 
approximately 1/3 of them were engaged in mopping-up operations and 
were mobile, the majority were employed in self-defense units in their 
own villages. The region was divided into areas comprising several 
villages and led by a commander subordinated to a so-called Bulgaro-
Macedonian Revolutionary Committee (Boulgaro-Makedoniko Epanastatiko 
Komitato), based in Kastoria. Italian instructions mandated that in case of 
a partisan attack armed Slavophones from other villages of the same area 
should come in support of the attacked village. If attacked the Italian 
Command of Kastoria could request each village to provide 20% of its 
armed men to form unities that were to be dissolved when the emergency 
was over.60 Securing supply lines was one of the key motivations behind 
the formation of these units. As the intelligence of the 1st German 
Mountain Division noted in the summer of 1943, during a tour of the 
Italian area, most "Bulgarian militias" were formed in villages lying along 
the Florina-Kastoria road.61 Italian forces rarely abandoned the town of 
Kastoria, leaving to the Slavophone units the task of fighting the 
partisans, their support being confined to aircraft bombing and shelling 
villages under partisan control.62 Moreover, they did not supply these 
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bands, or did this only insufficiently, so that they resorted massively to 
pillaging. The management of violence was thus largely left to local chiefs 
proving in many cases counterproductive. Not before long, the alliance 
between Italians and Slavophones underwent a serious crisis and in 
August the Committee was close to dissolution. 
In this period, the Bulgarian military tried to convince the Italians to 
allow them to take control of the Slavophone units. Bulgarian 
representatives travelled from Bitola to meet the officers of the Italian 
Command of Kastoria and asked to be entrusted the command of the Slav 
Macedonian military units. "In my opinion", recalled Italian Lieutenant 
Giovanni Ravalli in a postwar interrogation, "it is incontestable that 
Marinoff's intention to establish Bulgarian troops in our zone and still 
more to place Bulgarian officers at the head of the comitadjis bands had 
one sole object: to reinforce the Bulgarian interference in Kastoria and 
even his visit had that aim".63 As clearly expressed by Ravalli’s words, 
Marinoff’s intervention increased the Italians’ mistrust of the Slavophones 
as they feared that this may raise expectations of political autonomy.64 
Interestingly, the Bulgarian authorities held similar reservations as they 
saw the formation of the Committee as an Italian initiative they could 
hardly keep control of. 
While IMRO or other political forces had in this phase little or no real 
influence in the region and did not played a role in the formation of the 
Slavophone units65, armed collaboration seems to have followed rather a 
bottom-up logic. Generally speaking, there was, in those who sided with 
the Committee, a sense of empowerment as collaboration was seen as a 
chance to overturn existing hierarchies, in particular that between the 
Greek town and the Slavophone countryside. According to the memoirs 
of a gendarmerie officer, armed villagers blocked all accesses to the town 
under the motto: "Until now you sucked our blood. It is now our turn".66 
                                                 
63 Sworn Testimony of the Witness Ravalli, Athens, June 17, 1946, UNWCC, 67.041, reel 10, 
Holocaust Museum Washington DC, f. 1403. 
64 Magistrati (Italian Representative in Sofia) to Italian Foreign Ministry, 21 April 1943, 
ASMAE AP 31-45 Grecia b. 21. 
65 Ivan Mihailov, the leader of the organization who during the war resided in Zagreb, tried 
several times to meet Mussolini, but the Duce refused. According to S. Sfetas, at the 
beginning of 1943, Croatian leader Ante Pavelić went to Rome and convinced Mussolini to 
arm the Slavophones , Sfétas, "Ī ídrysī kai ī drásī tīs Ochránas”, 349. In Italian records, 
though, there is no evidence of this intervention.. 
66 Kōnstantínos Sp. Antōníoy, Ī slayikī́ kai kommunistikī́ epivoylī́ kai ī antístasis tōn Makedόnōn 




Crops collected by the state were seized by the villagers and entrusted to 
the Committee that was put in charge of food distribution. The Italian 
authorities also promised to dismiss officials originating from Southern 
Greece and replace them with Slavophones.  According to Tasos 
Kostopoulos,67 villages that engaged in armed collaboration were not 
those that in the interwar years were characterized by Greek state sources 
as "boulgarízontes". Therefore, no clear link connects the political struggles 
of the interwar years with collaboration during the war. In fact, ethnic 
conflicts as they developed during occupation were a decisive factor. Yet, 
also this explanation has to be taken with a grain of salt as it does not 
account for all of the choices made in those months. A further factor to be 
taken into account, according to Kostopoulos, were the relations 
developed between a certain village and the occupying forces. Villages 
that had experienced Italian violence in previous years mostly chose to 
side with the resistance. Also, the existence of strong links with Bulgaria, 
for example in villages that had had a consistent emigration to Bulgaria in 
the interwar years, led to side with the Committee. Finally, of course, the 
existence of a strong network of EAM-activists in a village prevented it 
from joining the collaborationist forces.  
By this time the Italian authorities had shifted significantly their 
strategy of governance. If they had initially relied on the Greek state 
authorities as an instrument of indirect rule, they now took the collapse of 
the Greek state's monopoly of violence as a matter of fact and sought 
therefore to establish a direct alliance with social and ethnic groups. Both 
strategies of governance - the one adopted in 1941-42 and that of 1943 – 
were largely the result of a lack of knowledge about the local society and 
of sufficient resources to govern it by creating strong and reliable 
alliances with local actors. If we understand occupation as a form of 
"inter-organizational organization"68, in which a military force rules a 
foreign society through collaboration of locals, be they state officials or 
differently legitimized social actors, the Italian occupation suffered from 
its very beginning of a shortage of resources to activate collaboration. The 
relations between the Italian garrison and the Committee show 
sufficiently that the Italian way of indirect rule was highly inefficient. 
Moreover, it was hampered by the constant lack of trust towards groups 
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perceived as ethnic minorities that derived from Italian weakness as a 
protecting power in the region. 
Conclusion 
The history of Kastoria allows us to observe the development of 
interethnic violence with a micro-analytical approach, dismissing 
explanations based exclusively on political ideologies.   
The occupiers' policy was not the cause of ethnic conflicts, nor was it 
the preceding history of discrimination against the Slavophone 
population, though these for obvious reasons were preconditions to the 
deepening of ethnic cleavages. Crucial was the unleashing of social 
dynamics during occupation and the complex interaction between 
multiple actors - Italian occupation authorities, Greek state authorities, 
Bulgarian representatives, Greek resistance - that led to the ethnicization 
of conflicts over resources. Recent studies on inter-ethnic violence in the 
Balkans during WWII69 suggest that, although inter-ethnic conflicts were 
part of social life before the war, they were not necessarily the only way 
social conflicts were coded. In the case of Kastoria, as we have seen, 
ethnicity was only one of the possible ways to play out social conflicts in 
the interwar years. This pattern was reactivated during the Metaxas years 
leading to a dramatic surge of violence in the context of the economic 
crisis and famine unleashed by occupation. This interpretation is 
consistent with what social scientists have argued about the dynamics of 
civil conflicts in different regions. While preexisting collective identities 
do play a role in unleashing ethnic conflicts, group-making is largely the 
product of social variables, among which modernization is a key factor 
conducive to the rise of grievances against the political center.70 
Moreover, according to recent scholarship, the inability of failed states to 
control a peripheral region is crucial in determining the rise of 
insurgencies.71 Finally, the case of Kastoria shows that civil strife is 
sparked by conceptions of moral economy shaping the expectations of 
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actors about the fair distribution of resources.72 Thus, it reminds of us of 
the importance of avoiding sharp distinctions between material and 
symbolic factors in explaining violence and civil war.73 
While conflicts and violence were the result of the interaction 
between multiple actors, a dynamic in which the occupiers were not 
always the driving force, the Italians did constitute a important variable 
as they had the higher instance in the managing of weapons. In fact, the 
Italian decision to arm the Slavophone villages exacerbated leading ethnic 
polarization leading to the formation of two opposing camps one 
identifying with Bulgarian nationalism and the other with the resistance 
in its different versions, the SNOF or the EAM/ELAS. 
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